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United States v. Albank, FSB: Is "Justice" Being Served in the
Enforcement of Fair Lending Laws?

I. INTRODUCTION

On August 13, 1997, Albank Federal Savings Bank (Albank)
settled a lending discrimination suit brought by the Department of
Justice (DOJ).' In its complaint, the DOJ alleged that Albank had
violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA)2 and the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA)3 by failing to provide service in certain
cities in Connecticut, or below Interstate 287 in Westchester County,
New York.4
These areas contained "significant" minority
populations, and failing to do business there constituted the practice
of"redlining" according to the DOJ. 5
Like the high profile Chevy Chase Bank settlement in 1994,
Albank has sounded a warning to the banking industry as another
example of the DOJ's broad and judicially untested application of the
FHA and ECOA. The suits against Albank and Chevy Chase Bank
did not involve standard redlining cases where a lender discriminated
against an applicant from a specifically delineated area in which the
lender chose not to conduct business. 6 Instead, Albank was cited for
discriminating against minority groups generally by not marketing its

1. See Albank Consent Decree, United States v. Albank, FSB, No. 97-CV-1206
(N.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 13, 1997).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1994).

3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1994).
4. See Albank Complaint, United States v. Albank, FSB, No. 97-CV-1206 (N.D.N.Y.
filed Aug. 13, 1997) at 1.
5. See id. at 6, 7.
6. See Michael B. Mierzewski & Richard L. Jacobs, What Hath Justice Department
Wrought Through Chevy Chase?, BANKING PoL'Y REP., Feb. 6, 1995, at 8, available in
LEXIS, BANKNG Library, BNKPOL File; see also Thomas P. Vartanian, et al., Justice
Department Settles FairLending Claim Based On Redlining Allegation, Fair Lending Alert
No. 97-8-19, Aug. 19, 1997, (visited Oct. 2, 1997) <http://www.ffhsj.com/

fairlend/flarch/fl970819.htm> (noting that redlining allegations traditionally involve
discrimination against an actual applicant).
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products in certain areas-a practice the DOJ calls "marketing
discrimination" and claims to be prohibited by the FHA and ECOA.7
Albank also represents another example of a lender agreeing
to settle rather than litigate the merits of a DOJ complaint. Yet, after
the Chevy Chase consent decree, legal and industry experts were
questioning the legal sufficiency of FHA and ECOA violations based
on marketing discrimination. One must ask why lenders choose not
to challenge such questionable allegations in the courts. Clearly,
however, the banking industry must scrutinize these cases to avoid
becoming victims of FHA and ECOA violation claims brought by
the DOJ.
Part II of this Comment examines the facts in the Albank
settlement, including the allegations of redlining, FHA and ECOA
violations made by the DOJ, the response by Albank, and a brief
explanation of the particulars of the consent decree.9 Next, Part III
analyzes the only comparable case to Albank, the Chevy Chase Bank
case. 10 Part IV assesses the future implications of fair lending laws
in light of the Albank and Chevy Chase settlements, specifically with
regard to how the interpretation of redlining has been redefined and
expanded by the current DOJ to include marketing discrimination."
Part IV also examines whether marketing discrimination is truly a
violation under the FHA or ECOA and whether the DOJ could, or
2
should, bring actions based on this theory of lending discrimination.'
Part IV then examines why banks seem to settle claims brought by
the DOJ rather than litigate them. 3 Finally, Part V concludes that
not only are DOJ lawyers rewriting the law instead of enforcing it,
they are intimidating lenders into accepting settlements. 4

7. Albank Complaint at 8. For a discussion regarding the DOJ's view of marketing
discrimination see then Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, Deval L. Patrick,
Remarks at the Independent BankersAssociation ofAmerica Annual Convention, Honolulu,
Hawaii, (Feb. 14, 1995), (visited Oct. 2, 1997) <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/speeches
speechiba.txt>.

8. See infra notes 67-90 and accompanying text.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See infra notes 15-66 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 67-90 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 91-103 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 114-28 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
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THE ALBANK COMPLAINT AND SETTLEMENT

The Facts

Albank is a federally chartered thrift institution that primarily
conducts business in the Northeast.15 It "offers the services of a
traditional depository institution, including receipt of monetary
deposits, financing of residential housing, and other types of credit
transactions."16 In addition, Albank is FDIC insured and regulated
by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). 7
Albank solicits home mortgage loan applications directly and
through independent "correspondents" who submit applications to
Albank for underwriting and purchase, if approved by Albank. 8 In
the mid-1980s, Albank agreed to fund correspondent loans on
residences located in Connecticut and Westchester County, New
York. 19
By the late 1980s, however, Albank instructed
correspondents that it would no longer accept loans originating in
specific areas of these markets."
1. Alleged Marketing Discrimination in Connecticut
Albank agreed to fund correspondent loans for home
mortgages on properties in western Connecticut, but expressly
discontinued servicing five cities: Hartford, New Haven, New
Britain, Waterbury, and Bridgeport.2
African-Americans and
Hispanics comprise a majority of the population in three of these
cities, and almost a quarter of the population in the other two cities.22
From 1992 through 1996, Albank made three exceptions to its policy
of not funding loans from these cities by accepting two loan

15. See Albank Complaint at 1.
16. Id. at 2.

17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 4.

20. See id. at5.
21. See id. at 6.
22. See id.
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applications from white individuals and one from an Asian-American
individual.23
Albank also instructed correspondents that it would no longer
accept loans from the "Long Island Sound area," defined by Albank
as "the corridor along Interstate 95 in southern Connecticut,"
including the cities of Stamford and Norwalk.24 African-Americans
and Hispanics comprise approximately twenty-five percent of the
population of each city.2 5 From 1992 through 1996, Albank made
exceptions to this policy in twenty-five instances by accepting loan
applications from twenty-three white applicants and one each from
an African-American and Hispanic applicant. 26 During the same
period, "in those areas of Connecticut outside these seven cities ...
Albank took 550 applications from whites, six from AfricanAmericans, three from Hispanics, and twenty-eight from applicants
from other minority groups or from applicants who provided no
27
racial/ethnic identification.,
2. Alleged Marketing Discrimination in Westchester County,
New York
In the mid-1980's, Albank agreed to fund home mortgage
loans in Westchester County, New York, provided that
correspondent mortgage bankers and brokers did not offer loans to
Albank from areas below Interstate 287, which cuts across
Westchester County from west to east.28 Census data indicates that
over seventy-six percent of the county's African-American
population and over sixty-six percent of the county's Hispanic
population live in this excluded area. 29 From 1992 through 1996,
Albank accepted thirty-nine applications from individuals south of
23. See id.
24. Id.

25. See id.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 6, 7.
28. See id. at 7. This area of "southern Westchester County" below Interstate 287
borders on New York City and includes the cities of Yonkers, Mount Vernon, Hartsdale,
Scarsdale, Larchmont, New Rochqlle, and White Plains. Neighborhoods in the area range

from lower middle-class to affluent. See County of Westchester, Almanac, (visited March 4,
1998) <http:/www.nydems.org/regions/westchester/almanac.html>.
29. See Albank Complaint at 7.
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Interstate 287, and none were from African-American or Hispanic
applicants."
In early 1997, the OTS conducted an examination of
Albank's practices to evaluate its compliance with the FHA and
ECOA.3" The OTS determined that Albank's oral and written
instructions to its correspondents not to submit loan applications
from specified geographic areas constituted a pattern or practice of
discrimination against substantial African-American and Hispanic
populations who would be denied access to Albank's services.32 In
May 1997, OTS referred the matter to the DOJ pursuant to the
ECOA,33 and the DOJ conducted a supplemental investigation.34
B.

The DOJ's Claim

The DOJ contended that Albank's explicit instructions to its
correspondents that it would not accept loans from specific
geographic areas had "no sound business justification" and "departed
from accepted mortgage banking and loan purchase practices."35
Non-contiguous enclaves were created within the area Albank
ostensibly served; thus, the DOJ alleged that "the restrictions were
adopted for the purpose of precluding residents of identifiably
minority urban areas from seeking mortgage loans from the
defendants."36
As evidence of Albank's intention to discriminate, the DOJ
cited the fact that in the seven Connecticut cities in which Albank
decided to discontinue service, African-Americans and Hispanics
comprised a substantial percentage of the population.37 The DOJ
also noted that when exceptions were made, they were almost always

30. See id. at 8.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See id. at 3.
See id.
15 U.S.C. § 1691e (1994).
See Albank Complaint at 3.
Id. at 5.
Id.

37. See id. at 6.
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The result of Albank's Connecticut policy was

that almost all of its loan applications came from whites.39
With regard to Albank's practices in Westchester County, the
DOJ noted that the area south of Interstate 287 excluded by Albank
contained over seventy-six percent of the county's African-American
population, and over sixty-six percent of the county's Hispanic

population. 0 As in Connecticut, almost all of Albank's loan
applications in Westchester County from 1992 through 1996 were
from whites;4 and when exceptions were made, not one was for an
African-American or Hispanic applicant.42
Thus, the DOJ claimed Albank had engaged in
"discriminatory redlining" because "these restrictions [had] both the
purpose and effect of denying residents of identifiable AfricanAmerican and Hispanic communities an equal opportunity to obtain
mortgage financing. ' 4 3 Specifically, the DOJ alleged that Albank's

actions constituted: (1) discrimination on the basis of race, color,
and national origin in making available residential real estate-related
transactions in violation of section 805 of the FHA;4 4 (2) restriction
of the availability of dwellings to persons because of race, color, and
national origin in violation of section 804(a) of the FHA;45 and (3)
discrimination against applicants with respect to credit transactions

on the basis of race, color, or national origin in violation of the
ECOA.4 6 The DOJ concluded that "the discriminatory policies of
Albank were.., intentional and willful."47
38. See supra notes 23, 26 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Note the subtle change in language used
by the DOJ. In its discrimination claim regarding the Connecticut market, the DOJ used the
percentage of African-Americans and Hispanics measured against the entire population of
each city to support its claim of discrimination. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
In claiming discrimination in Westchester County, the DOJ compared the percentage of
African-Americans and Hispanics south of Interstate 287 to their respective populations
north of Interstate 287. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Of the part of southern
Westchester County that Albank excluded, African-Americans and Hispanics comprised
31% of the population.
41. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
42. See Albank Complaint at 8.
43. Id.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a) (1994); see also Albank Complaint at 8.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a); see also Albank Complaint at 8.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1994); see also Albank Complaint at 8.
47. Albank Complaint at 8, 9. Albank strongly denied the DOJ's contentions. Albank

19981
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Albank's Response

Herbert G. Chorbajian, Chairman, President, and Chief
Executive Officer of Albank "categorically" denied that Albank
intentionally violated fair lending or equal credit opportunity laws,
citing an "Outstanding" rating on each of Albank's last three biannual Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) examinations.
Mr.
Chorbajian claimed that the criteria employed by Albank in
purchasing out-of-area mortgage loans was based primarily on
"credit quality considerations" and the "desire to stay within markets
similar to [Albank's] upstate New York lending area."49
Mr. Chorbajian further noted that "Albank has never directly
originated mortgage loans in Connecticut and Westchester County"
and that "[t]hese areas were not part of [Albank's] primary lending
market area or CRA delineated service area."50 Furthermore, Mr.
Chorbajian stated that "[Albank has] no branch offices or loan
origination centers in these areas."51
Mr. Chorbajian also explained that Albank began to purchase
adjustable rate mortgage loans in Westchester County in the mid1980s52 with activity limited to northern Westchester County because
had granted the first mortgages for rehabilitation of older properties in Arbor Hill, an
African-American community in Albany, New York. See Albank Consent Decree at 24.
Well before the investigation, Albank had participated in mortgage loan programs through a
variety of community agencies and governmental entities including: Inter-Faith Homes
Inc., Better Albany Living, Capital Hill Improvement Corporation, Rockland Count
Rehabilitation and Grant Program, Beacon Community Development Agency, Kingston
Council, Newburgh Community Development Department, and the City of Oneida's Block
Grant Program. See id. at 23. In addition, Albank had invested in media directed toward
various minority groups, including advertising over a Spanish radio station, in the Spanish
Yellow Pages in Massachusetts, and in the Hudson Valley Black Press. See id. at 23, 24.
48. Albank Resolves Fair Lending Allegations by U.S. Department of Justice, Aug. 13,
1997, at 2 (on file with author) [hereinafter Albank Press Release] . In enacting the CRA,
Congress required each appropriate federal financial supervisory agency to assess an
institution's record of helping to meet the credit needs of the local community in which the
institution is chartered, consistent with the safe and sound operation of the institution. The
DOJ was given no role in enforcing the CRA. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.11 (b) (1997).
49. Albank Press Release, supra note 48, at 2.
50. Id. A bank is required to delineate its lending community. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.41(a)
(1997).
51. Albank Press Release, supra note 48, at 2.
52. See id. Albank made a decision in the 1980s to convert its fixed-rate mortgage
portfolio to a largely rate-sensitive asset. See id. Thus, Albank experienced more demand
for adjustable-rate mortgage loans than supply. See id. In addition, Albank agreed to
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the real estate market in that area was similar to those in counties
where Albank previously had been lending. 3 Albank wanted to
avoid purchasing loans in the more affluent suburbs of lower
Westchester County because Albank was "uncomfortable with the
relatively high land values."54
Mr. Chorbajian noted that minorities comprised only thirtyone percent of the population south of Interstate 287 in Westchester
County, and Albank had "no intent to exclude [this area] because of
its racial composition."55 In addition, the five million nine-hundred
thousand dollars in loans originated by mortgage bankers and
purchased by Albank in 1995 represented only 0.20 percent of all the
mortgage loans made by all lenders in Westchester County in 1995
and only 2.3 percent of Albank's mortgage loan volume in 1995.6
In the late 1980's, Albank began purchasing adjustable-rate
mortgages in western Connecticut counties that were contiguous to
In the early 1990's, Albank
its New York real estate markets.
experienced rising delinquencies and significant losses in the
Connecticut portfolio, which Albank attributed to the area's rising
unemployment rates." To reduce its exposure, Albank "temporarily"
ceased investing in markets where it "experienced relatively high
levels of delinquencies and where property values had experienced
sharp declines."59 Mr. Chorbajian denied that racial composition was
a factor in this consideration. In 1995, Albank's purchase of
approximately twelve million dollars in loans from mortgage bankers
in Connecticut "represented 0.13 [percent] of the loans made in the
state by all lenders in that year and 4.5 [percent] of Albank's total
mortgage loan volume in 1995. "60

broaden its market to northern Westchester County in order to meet its demand but
maintained the desire to stay in markets similar to its upstate New York lending area. See
id.

53. See id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 3.
56. See id.

57. See id.
58. See id. Albank attributed this rising unemployment to cutbacks in the defense and
insurance industries which resulted in a substantial decline in property values. See id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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Mr. Chorbajian insisted that Albank's purchase of one
hundred total loans in Connecticut and Westchester County in all of
1995 had no "meaningful impact on availability of funding for home
ownership in those markets."61 In addition, Albank maintained that
the DOJ "failed to recognize the legitimate and non-discriminatory
business and economic reasons" for the exclusion of these markets.62
However, Albank agreed to accept the conditions of the consent
decree, contending that fighting the DOJ's allegations would have
been costly and would have "hampered the Bank's strategic growth
plans. 63
D.

The Albank Consent Decree

Under the terms of the consent decree, Albank agreed to
make available fifty-five million dollars in below-market mortgage
loans to homebuyers in the allegedly redlined areas of Connecticut
and southern Westchester County.6
In addition, Albank must
contribute three-hundred fifty thousand dollars over the next five
years to support semi-annual "Homebuying Seminars" and other
"homebuyer education and counseling programs" provided by
Albank and local organizations. 65 As part of a targeted marketing
program, Albank must advertise its product in "media directed to
members of minority communities. 66
III. THE CHEVY CHASE BANK CONSENT DECREE
The DOJ settlement with Albank was not the first of its kind.
Since 1992, the DOJ has settled many high profile cases with lenders
based on violations of the FHA and ECOA, 67 including a settlement
61. Id. at 3,4.
62. Id. at 3.
63. Id. at 4.
64. See Albank Consent Decree at 6. Specifically, Albank will make $35 million in
loans at 1.5% below market rate in the seven Connecticut cities over the next five years and
$20 million in loans at 1.5% below market rate in southern Westchester County over the
next twenty-six months. See id. at 9, 10. Albank's subsidy for this lending plan
approximates $8.2 million. See id.
65. See id. at 7, 8.
66. Id. at 6.
67. See Thomas P. Vartanian, et al.,
Chevy Chase Case Sets New Standards for Fair
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with Chevy Chase Bank based on a novel interpretation of redlining
and lending discrimination under the statutes.68
The DOJ's
complaint against Chevy Chase Bank alleged that the bank

intentionally avoided serving African-American residential areas in
the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Commentators were quick
to note that "there was not a single claim that Chevy Chase had
discriminated against any individual applicant or borrower., 69 In
previous settlements based on FHA and ECOA violations, the DOJ

cited specific, identifiable instances of lending discrimination in its
complaint.7"
Thus, Chevy Chase Bank became the first bank accused of

redlining on a broad market discrimination theory without any
individual discrimination claims. The issues Chevy Chase raised and
the reaction of the banking and legal communities are important to
analyze in light of the recent settlement in Albank. A review of both
enforcement actions may reveal how the DOJ is interpreting and
enforcing fair lending laws and how banks may avoid becoming
unwitting victims of a DOJ investigation.
The DOJ began investigating Chevy Chase in June of 1993
after the Washington Post ran a series of articles on lending practices
in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area noting the disparities in
the number of mortgage loans made in predominantly white and
black neighborhoods.71 The DOJ determined that Chevy Chase
Lending Law Compliance, BANKING POL'Y REP., Sept. 19, 1994, at 1, available in LEXIS,
BANKNG Library, BNKPOL File. Some of these include high profile settlement
agreements with Shawmut Mortgage Co. in Boston, First National Bank of Vicksburg,
Mississippi, and Blackpipe State Bank in South Dakota. See id.
68. See Mierzewski & Jacobs, supra note 6. The DOJ admitted that the Chevy Chase
case was a novel and untested legal theory, calling the settlement "unprecedented." See
DOJ Obtains Unprecedented Settlement From D.C. Area Bank For Allegedly Failing To
Service Predominantly Black Areas (Department of Justice Press Release, Washington,
D.C.), Aug. 22, 1994 ( on file with author) [hereinafter DOJ Press Release].
69. Mierzewski & Jacobs, supra note 6.
70. See id. In the DOJ settlement with Decatur Federal Savings and Loan, the DOJ
cited as proof of discrimination against specific individuals the fact that three times as many
minority applicants were rejected as white applicants. See id. In the Shawmut Mortgage
settlement in 1993, the DOJ again cited the higher denial rates of minority applicants than
white applicants as proof of discrimination against individual borrowers. See id. In the
First National Bank of Vicksburg settlement, the DO) alleged that the bank was charging
African-American borrowers a higher rate of interest on less advantageous terms than white
borrowers for unsecured home improvement loans. See id.
71. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 68. The series was entitled, "Separate and
Unequal." Joel G. Brenner, A Pattern of Bias in Mortgage Loans, WASH. POST, June 6,
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underwrote approximately ninety-seven percent of its loans from
1976 through 1992 in predominantly white areas. 2

Although the

DOJ did not find a single instance of discrimination against any
particular applicant, Attorney General Janet Reno stated: "[t]o shun
an entire community because of its racial makeup, is just as wrong as
to reject an applicant because they [sic] are African-American."' 3
At the time of the investigation, Chevy Chase was the largest
Savings and Loan in the Washington, D.C. area, operating seventyfour branches. The DOJ noted that the bank's expansion "[had]
taken place in a metropolitan area with segregated living patterns." 5
Using the bank's CRA statement, the DOJ cited as evidence of
discrimination the lack of effort made by Chevy Chase to market its
services in the African-American areas of Washington, D.C. and
neighboring Prince George's County, Maryland.

6

Chevy Chase had previously included the District of
Columbia in its CRA delineated area but had no branches in the
District and made "few loans outside of heavily white residential
areas."" However, in 1989 Chevy Chase eliminated the District of
Columbia from its delineated community, although it had a branch in
the "heavily white upper Northwest area,""8 which in 1992, Chevy

Chase added to its CRA delineated area. 79 African-Americans
constitute 65.1 percent of the population of the District of Columbia,
and 90.3 percent of African-Americans in the District live in census
tracts located mostly in the Northeast, Southeast, and Southwest
80
quadrants.
1993, at Al (first article in three-part series).
72. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 68.
73. Id.
74. See Consent Decree, United States v. Chevy Chase Fed. Says. Bank (last modified
Feb. 13, 1998) <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cases/cc.txt> [hereinafter Chevy Chase].
75. Id.
76. See id. at 5, 6.
77. Id.at 5.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 5, 6. An independent legal opinion analyzing Chevy Chase's delineation
concluded that it was fully in compliance with established CRA standards in light of the
Act's legislative history, OTS implementing regulations, and examination guidelines.
Chevy Chase used deposits from the community as a basis for delineating its lending
community, which is entirely consistent with the CRA. OTS Rewrites its Rules on CRA
Territory, AMERcAN BANKER-BoND BuYER, Nov. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, ABBB File.
80. See Chevy Chase, supra note 74.
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Thus, the DOJ's complaint against Chevy Chase was not
really based on lending discrimination, but rather that the bank failed
to market its services in African-American residential areas."' The
DOJ admitted that the case against Chevy Chase was "the first
lending discrimination suit focusing solely on a bank's refusal to
market its services in minority neighborhoods."82
Ultimately, Chevy Chase settled the case, agreeing to a
consent decree similar to the one Albank would sign three years
later." Under the terms of the consent decree, Chevy Chase agreed
to open three mortgage offices and one bank branch in predominantly
African-American census tracts of the Washington, D.C.
metropolitan area.'
Chevy Chase was required to advertise its
services to African-Americans, with such specific provisions as
placing 960 column-inches of advertising in print media oriented to
African-Americans and 360 thirty second spots per year on radio
stations oriented to African-Americans. 5 Other provisions of the
consent decree included recruitment of African-Americans for
positions within the company and mandated meetings with
"members of at least three African-American community or civic
groups to examine current Mortgage Company loan products,
services, and advertising."86
Monetary relief consisted of eleven million dollars of
investment in the areas allegedly redlined by Chevy Chase. At least
seven million dollars was designated for "special mortgage loans"
whereby "persons living in the defined census tracts" were granted a
four hundred dollar waiver of fees; were given an option of obtaining
a mortgage loan at one percent below the rate the bank would
otherwise charge, or one-half percent below-market interest rate; and
were given a grant in the amount of two percent of the loan which
would be applied to the down payment requirement.8 8 As Albank
had, Chevy Chase categorically denied allegations of intentional
81. See Mierzewski & Jacobs, supranote 6.
82. DOJ Press Release, supranote 68.
83. See Vartanian, et al., supra note 67.

84. See id.; see also Chevy Chase, supra note 74.
85. See Vartanian, et al., supra note 67; see also Chevy Chase, supra note 74.
86. See Chevy Chase, supranote 74.

87. See id.
88. Id.
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discrimination. 9 Similarly to Albank, Chevy Chase cited the
tremendous cost in fighting the DOJ as its reason for settling the
case. 90

IV.

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

Albank is significant in that it is the second in what may
become a trend of marketing discrimination cases pursued under the
DOJ's new definition of redlining. When Chevy Chase was settled
in 1994, its impact and future effects were uncertain. 91 Perhaps
gaining confidence from Chevy Chase, the DOJ's settlement with
Albank may signify the Department's willingness to elevate its new
approach to fair lending to the level of de facto law, knowing banks
will not expend the necessary resources in high profile legal battles.
In Albank's aftermath, lenders must assess current policies and
procedures to determine whether they are in compliance with this
new interpretation of the law or risk the scrutiny of a DOJ lawsuit.
This section analyzes marketing discrimination and compares
it to the more traditionally understood definition of redlining,
assessing some factors the DOJ looks at when investigating a bank.
Perhaps more importantly, this section analyzes whether marketing
discrimination is truly a FHA or ECOA violation or, more properly,
a CRA violation.

89. See Letter From B. Francis Saul III to Chevy Chase Bank and Cu stomers in CHnvY
CHASE BANK, FSB, Community Lending Performance (1994) (on file with author). In a
booklet distributed by the bank following the settlement, Chevy Chase calls the DOJ's
allegations of redlining "categorically false" and cites the fact that its lending in
supposedly redlined areas in the District of Columbia constituted 71.1% of all such lending
in the District during the period from 1988 to 1993-almost 1,200 of a total of 1,677 loans
were made in "redlined" areas. See id.
90. See id. Many in Washington believe that since Chevy Chase was a "small player"
nationally and would suffer economically from lengthy litigation, the DOJ used the bank to
achieve what it truly wanted-a precedent that will be used to compel large banking
institutions to comply with its view of fair lending. See What Hath Justice Wrought?,
AMRIcmAN BANKER-BOND BuYER, Sept. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
ABBB File.
91. SeeMierzewski & Jacobs, supra note 6; Vartanian, et al., supra note 67.
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MarketingDiscrimination

The DOJ claims that the rules regarding fair lending are the
same as they always have been, specifically, "the law requires that
lending institutions select their markets, provide services within
those markets and treat loan applicants in a manner that is free of
racial discrimination. '2 Albank and Chevy Chase seem to stretch
this fair lending definition beyond the letter and spirit of the law.
Redlining is "the practice of refusing to make loans in certain
neighborhoods regardless of the credit worthiness of applicants."93
Prior to Albank and Chevy Chase, it was commonly understood that
liability for redlining required that an actual applicant from a
redlined community be denied credit.94 Chevy Chase expanded that
traditional definition to include what the DOJ calls "marketing
discrimination,"95 where lenders who do not market their products
sufficiently or do not expand their markets to include minority
neighborhoods, could be found to have denied credit to a "redlined
area" in violation of the FIA and ECOA.9 6
According to the DOJ, marketing discrimination is
"discrimination on the basis of race in the service that a lender
provides within its chosen market or in its method of choosing its
market."97 The DOJ claims to be interested in eliminating "arbitrary
92. Patrick, supra note 7; see also Kerry Ann Scanlon, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights, Remarks at the National FairHousing Alliance Annual Summit,
Washington D.C., (Nov. 6, 1994). (visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/
speeches/nfha2.txt>.
93. DOJAttacks Bank Marketing, BranchingPatternsfor First Time, BANKING POL'Y
REP., Sept. 5, 1994, at 4, availablein LEXIS, BANKNG Library, BNKPOL File.
94. For an example of the more traditional practice of redlining, see the Decatur
Federal Savings Consent Decree whereby the bank agreed to pay $1 million to specific
individuals whose mortgage applications were denied because the bank circumscribed the
African-American communities in the Atlanta area. See Mierzewski & Jacobs, supra note
6.
95. Patrick, supra note 7.
96. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 68. Again, note the comment from United
States Attorney General, Janet Reno, stating: "To shun an entire community because of its
racial makeup, is just as wrong as to reject an applicant because they [sic] are African
American." Id. This statement by Janet Reno links marketing discrimination to traditional
redlining by implying that a lender not marketing its services in a community is
commensurate with unfairly denying credit to an actual person from that community. See
id. Interestingly, the Attorney General implicitly admits that marketing discrimination is
not redlining by comparing the two and concluding each is wrong. See id.
97. See Patrick, supra note 7.
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racial presumptions from the business calculus. ' 98 In fact, the DOJ
has applied vague and arbitrary standards in the area of fair lending
that have not only worked to confound lenders but other federal
agencies as well. 99 Following the Chevy Chase settlement, Jonathan
Fiechter, then acting director of the OTS, publicly criticized the DOJ
for applying judicially untested law and failing to engage in
constructive meetings with the heads of Chevy Chase Bank and thrift
regulatory agencies.'
Some factors the DOJ will examine when investigating
allegations of marketing discrimination include "the means of service
the lender has chosen and how it operates in practice; the loan
products that it offers; its efforts to reach out to minority real estate
professionals and loan applicants as compared to its efforts to solicit
business from whites; and ...its success in extending credit to its
market without racial impact." ' Lenders must be careful that their
policies and practices do not offend these vague standards. The DOJ
claims to treat no one factor as dispositive but "will look for
evidence of differential treatment or impact, and then whether the
treatment or impact has any other explanation besides race."1 2
President and Chief Executive Officer of Albank, Herbert
Chorbajian, argues that this last point was ignored by the DOJ in its
investigation of Albank103
B.

DisparateImpact

To further confuse industry experts, the DOJ intimated that it
may continue to move away from the more concrete "disparate
treatment" test and embrace a more vague and sweeping "disparate
98. Id.
99. When asked, the DOJ had a difficult time clarifying its own interpretation of fair
lending and marketing discrimination. Telephone interview with Paul F. Hancock, Acting
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Joan A. Magagna, Acting Chief, Housing and Civil

Enforcement Section (Oct. 1997).
100. See OTS Not Pleased with Justice Approach, AMERICAN BANKER-BOND BuYER,
Oct. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, ABBB File.
101. Patrick, supranote 7.
102. Id.
103. See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text. Chevy Chase also produced
compelling evidence of its commitment to lend to minority populations. The DOJ was not
impressed. See supranotes 79 and 89 and accompanying text.
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impact' test to determine if lenders are engaging in lending
discrimination.'" 4 The disparate treatment test examines "whether
banks are treating individual credit applicants differently on the basis
of factors not allowed under the law."' °5 For example, it would
clearly be unlawful for a bank to charge minorities a higher rate of
interest on loans than it would charge whites. In contrast, "[u]nder
disparate impact analysis, a practice that is non-discriminatory on its
face could violate the law if it produces a disproportionate and
adverse impact on a protected class of persons, whether or not there
was an intent to discriminate."'0 6 If the DOJ utilizes a disparate
impact analysis, banks implementing the same lending practices may
face liability in one community and not in another, depending on the
results of those practices. One can see the potential problems this
analysis could raise when factors other than race may explain a
disparate impact. Banks must become fortune-tellers, predicting the
results of facially nondiscriminatory practices on different
communities. If the DOJ applies a disparate impact litmus test, a
lender must be careful to ensure equal results for all racial and ethnic
groups throughout its entire lending community. 7 Of course a bank
cannot know the impact of a policy on a specific community until
after that policy has been fully implemented, at which point it may
be too late to avoid liability.
If a disparate impact is found during the course of an
investigation, the DOJ will determine whether there was a "business
necessity" for the policy or practice at issue." 8 Business necessity,
as defined by a Joint Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending
put out by ten federal agencies, states that "the justification must be
manifest and may not be hypothetical or speculative."'0 9 In addition,
"[flactors that may be relevant to the justification could include cost
104. See R. Christian Bruce & Alex D. McElroy, FairLending: Small Business Loans
are Next Focusfor FairLending Scrutiny, Experts Say, 69 Banking Rep. (BNA) 475, 476
(Sept. 22, 1997); see also Patrick, supra note 7.
105. Bruce & McElroy, supra note 104, at 476.
106. Id.
107. In fact, the DOJ suggested that a lender policy refusing to originate loans for less
than sixty thousand dollars may violate the disparate impact test because it may adversely
impact minorities. See David E. Teitelbaum, Developments in Fair Lending and
Community Reinvestment, 50 Bus. LAw. 1023, 1031 (1995).
108. Id. at 1028.
109. Id. at 1029.
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and profitability."'' 0 Whether cost and profitability could actually
defeat a disparate impact finding remains an open question. "If there
is a legitimate justification for such practice and there is no
alternative policy or practice that could serve the same purpose with
less discriminatory effect, no unlawful discrimination will be
found." '
The burden to prove that a practice is a business necessity lies
with the lender, and such a defense is difficult to maintain. 12 A
lender would have to prove both a business necessity and the absence
of an alternative policy that could serve the same purpose with a less
discriminatory effect.'13 Given the DOJ's willingness to impose
disparate impact analysis, it is doubtful that a bank. could avoid
liability by justifying a policy on economic factors. Albank and
Chevy Chase both seemed to have rational economic reasons for
their lending practices, but a business necessity was not found.
C.

FHA/ECOA or CRA?

A troubling aspect for lenders trying to understand the DOJ's
interpretation of fair lending laws is that cases such as Albank and
Chevy Chase were not litigated but settled, with neither side
conceding ground.'
There has been no real case law developed
under ECOA and the FHA since 1992, only DOJ consent decrees and
settlements." 5 In fact, it seems that in Chevy Chase, and perhaps
Albank, alleged violations of the FHA and the ECOA "[were] not
directly traceable to any specific provisions of those laws when
'
viewed in light of prior interpretations and precedents." 16
The two types of conduct understood to violate the FHA and
ECOA from prior precedent are "(1) discriminating on a prohibited
basis against individuals who have applied for a loan, or have been
granted a loan, and (2) discouraging individuals on a prohibited basis

110. Id.
111. Id.
at 1028.
112. See Bruce & McElroy, supra note 104, at 476.
113. See id.
114. See generally Albank Consent Decree; Chevy Chase, supra note 74.

115. See Bruce & McElroy,supra note 104, at 475.
116. Vartanian, et al.,
supra note 67.
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from submitting an application for credit.""' 7 In Chevy Chase and
Albank, the DOJ did not allege that either of these practices occurred,
but rather that both banks violated the FHA and ECOA by not
marketing their products vigorously in areas the DOJ thought they
should."' However, neither the FHA nor the ECOA requires lenders
to seek out and specifically market its services to members of
protected racial or ethnic groups."' Whether or not one agrees with
the social policy goals the DOJ sought to champion, the fact remains
that the DOJ should enforce the law, not rewrite the law.
The DOJ drafted complaints against Albank and Chevy
Chase alleging violations of the FA and ECOA, but used CRA
language as the basis of the violations. 20 For example, the DOJ
intimates that successful lending will be achieved by having a market
share of home mortgage loans in predominantly minority census
tracts that is reasonably comparable to market share in predominantly
white census tracts.1 2 1 One could argue that "[t]his language tracks
the controversial market share test in the banking agencies'
December 1993 proposed revisions of the CRA regulations.' ' 2
Nevertheless, neither the FHA nor the ECOA require consideration
of a market share test.
Congress passed the CRA in 1977 to address the problem of
lenders not reinvesting deposits "made by community residents in
the community in the form of loans to community residents or
businesses.' 23 The plain language of the CRA and its legislative
history make it clear that the only sanction Congress intended to
authorize for institutions whose operating performance did not
adequately meet the CRA's expressed goals of community
reinvestment was that "banking regulators may consider CRA
performance as one factor in the evaluation of an institution's
117. Id.
118. Seeid.

119. See id.
120. See id.Although the DOJ recognized it had no legal support for its position, it
likely calculated that both Chevy Chase and Albank would settle quickly and quietly rather
than be portrayed as defending discriminatory policies.

121. See id.; see also Albank Consent Decree at 6-8 (noting that under the terms of the
consent decree, Albank had to target allegedly redlined areas for special loans, marketing,
and educational programs).
122. Vartanian, et al., supra note 67.
123. Id.
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application for the expansion of its deposit-taking facilities. ''2 4
Enactment of the CRA was intended to be an incentive for lenders to
serve the credit needs of their communities, not a punitive measure to
be used by the DOJ to impose credit allocation. 125 Furthermore,
"Congress assigned the DOJ no role in implementing or enforcing
the CRA."' 6
The DOJ has circumvented its lack of enforcement power
under the CRA by incorporating CRA language into FHA and ECOA
complaints. It seeks to punish lenders for alleged CRA violations,
though proscribed by Congress from doing so. Instead, the DOJ
utilizes a marketing discrimination theory-a redefinition of CRA
language that is forcibly applied as a FHA and ECOA violation. The
DOJ has used the fair lending statutes to bring actions that have more
to do with the CRA than fair lending." 7
The "conceptual
underpinnings" of the case against Chevy Chase Bank are "replete
with CRA-type references to ascertainment of credit needs,
marketing, and branching decisions.""2 8
D.

ForcedSettlements?

Possibly the most troubling aspect of the DOJ basing its
enforcement of the fair lending laws on uncertain legal ground is that
these issues are never litigated. Instead, they are invariably settled
by consent decree, leaving other lenders looking for guidance about
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. Id. In perhaps another example of the DOJ's expansive reading of statutory
language, its complaint filed against American Family Insurance relied on the theory that
the FHA applied to insurance companies. See Michael B. Mierzewski & Beth S.
DeSimone, DOJ Seems Determined to Achieve FairLending Settlements, BANKING POL'Y
REP., Aug. 7, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, BANKNG Library, BNKPOL File. Neither
the language nor the legislative history of the FHA mention insurance as being covered by
the FHA, and amendments to include insurance companies failed several times in Congress.
See id. It is questionable if this "broad" interpretation of the FHA would have prevailed if
decided in the courts. See id. Instead, this case was settled by another DOJ Consent Decree
in March of 1995. See id.
127. See Teitelbaum, supra note 107, at 1036.
128. Id. The DOJ's own press release was not as carefully crafted as its complaint. Not
wanting to admit that the CRA was being used as a basis of its complaint against Chevy
Chase, the complaint did not mention a CRA violation. However, in its press release, the
DOJ stated that Chevy Chase "failed to meet the needs of the entire community in violation
of the Community Reinvestment Act." DOJ Press Release, supra note 68.
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marketing practices unsure of the legal ramifications of these
dispositions. 129 Both Albank and Chevy Chase denied that they
violated fair lending laws but could not afford to litigate the issues
because of the expense of defending against a DOJ suit, which even
if successful on the legal merits, would be a loser in the court of
public opinion. 3
In its complaint against Chevy Chase, the DOJ alleged FHA
and ECOA violations based on "branching decisions, marketing
practices, Chevy Chase's commission structure, the racial
composition of lending officers, and comparative market share in
predominantly white and black census tracts in the Washington, D.C.
metropolitan area."13 ' However, "[b]ecause the complaint itself
contain[ed] no clear statement of the legal principles the DOJ sought
to apply, it is unclear to what extent the DOJ would assert that such
evidence, individually or collectively, is sufficient to make a claim of
discrimination."' 32 Similarly, in its complaint against Albank, the
DOJ alleged lending violations based on marketing practices that
created noncontiguous enclaves where it would not accept loans and
instructions to correspondents prohibiting acceptance of loans from
specific geographic areas. Nonetheless, because these allegations
were ultimately settled, it is unclear whether either one or both
allegations were sufficient to make a claim of discrimination.' 33
The legal lessons to be learned from these important cases
remain largely uncertain. However, it seems clear that the DOJ won
on two counts. First, it established that marketing discrimination is a
legitimate and viable part of the fair lending equation. Second, by
not having to litigate the merits of the claims made in both
129. See Teitelbaum, supra note 107, at 1036. The use of CRA and market share
analysis beyond the legal parameters of the FHA and ECOA is particularly troubling given
that the DOJ, "by throwing substantial resources at individual cases, is able to force
settlements that never receive judicial review or even the public notice and comment that
would apply to such important regulatory policies if adopted by the federal banking
agencies." Id.
130. See Albank Consent Decree at 3; see also Albank Press Release, supra note 48. See
generally Letter from B. Francis Saul III to Chevy Chase Bank Customers and Friends in
CHEVY CHASE BANK, FSB., Community Lending Performance at 9 (1994) (on file with
author) (stating that over 71% of all Chevy Chase lending in the D.C. market was in
allegedly redlined areas).
131. Teitelbaum, supranote 107, at 1035.
132. Id.
133. See Albank Complaint at 5.
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complaints, it preserved the threat that any or all of these types of
claims could be wielded against unwary lenders in the future.
Because these cases were settled, the legal landscape has remained
murky, prompting some commentators to note that "despite the
sustained level of enforcement activity that now spans nearly five
years, there has been no real case law development under ECOA and
34
the Fair Housing Act."'
Perhaps the clearest lesson bankers can learn from Albank
and Chevy Chase is that a DOJ investigation of a lending institution
invariably will end in the lender settling rather than exhausting
considerable resources and enduring the high profile public relations
disaster of a court case. After the DOJ entered into consent decrees
with American Family Mutual Insurance Company and The Northern
Trust Company in 1995, industry experts concluded that "their
primary significance appears to be that, once an investigation
commences, the DOJ will continue to expend considerable resources
'
to enforce its view of the fair housing laws."135
V. CONCLUSION

The settlement in Albank represents the next step in the
136
DOJ's interpretation and enforcement of the CRA and ECOA.
Albank proves that Chevy Chase was not an anomaly but the start of
an aggressive DOJ policy to crack down on unfair lending practices.
Unfortunately, the DOJ's handling of these cases has left little room
for banks accused of unfair practices to present a defense. Lenders
are handcuffed because they understand that challenging a suit based
on lending discrimination is a loser economically and publicly. The
DOJ has unlimited resources to investigate and litigate. The DOJ
also wins the public relations battle, declaring itself the defender of
minority loan applicants.
The only defense for lenders seems to be prevention.
However, this defense that is not nearly as easy as it sounds.
Bankers must avoid policies or practices that could trigger a DOJ

134. Bruce & McElroy, supra note 104, at 475.
135. Mierzewski & DeSimone, supra note 126.
136. See supra notes 15-90 and accompanying text.
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investigation. However, if the DOJ continues using a disparate
impact test, the results of a given policy will not be known until after
its implementation. It seems that Chevy Chase met trouble by not
branching out into its entire CRA-delineated community.'
Although Chevy Chase originated loans to minorities and did not
discriminate against any identifiable applicant, the appearance that
the bank was not interested in marketing its services to AfricanAmericans in Washington, D.C., and Prince George's County,
Maryland, was determined to be discriminatory against the AfricanAmerican community as a whole." 8 In looking at the remedy for
these alleged violations, lenders should note that Chevy Chase was
compelled to locate branches in the alleged redlined areas, advertise
in black television and print media, recruit blacks for positions
within the company, and meet with black civic groups in the
community.39 Lenders should review their own policies and
practices in these areas to make sure they are marketing their services
to minority members of their lending community as vigorously as to
whites in that area.
The lessons to learn from Albank are perhaps more uncertain.
Albank believed that allegations of redlining could not be made if it
discontinued service to entire cities rather than certain neighborhoods
in Connecticut and picked a clearly defined boundary of Interstate
287 in Westchester County, New York. 4 Since the DOJ concluded
that both of these practices qualified as redlining, 4 ' it is unclear to
137. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
140. See Telephone Interview with Frehling H. Smith, Senior Vice President, Albank
Financial Corp., in Albany, New York (Oct. 14, 1997).
141. See Vartanian, et al., supra note 6. "Substantial" minority populations was not
defined by the DOJ, but using the Albank settlement as a guideline, it seems to encompass
above 25% of the area allegedly redlined. See supra notes 35-47.and accompanying text.
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what extent an area that contains substantial minority populations can
be safely excluded from a market. One sure red flag that seems
certain to draw DOJ attention is the creation of noncontiguous
minority enclaves within a CRA delineated lending community.
The lending community is at risk from this DOJ trend of
litigation. Bankers must collectively demand that the fair lending
laws be enforced, not rewritten, by the DOJ. Moreover, the DOJ
must not be allowed to substitute its ideas for law and intimidate
lenders into compliance.
JOHN J. SPINA

